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The Future of the Japanese Constitution:
From the “MacArthur Constitution” to What?*
Toshiyuki Nishikawa
　The Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 
and put into eﬀ ect on May 3, 1947. The American government as well 
as the American Constitution had a considerable inﬂ uence on the en-
actment process of the postwar constitution. It is often called the 
“MacArthur Constitution” because it was drafted by the staﬀ  of Gen-
eral MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers （SCAP）. 
There was a rather limited amount of input from the Japanese gov-
ernment and the Japanese people. The constitution was hurriedly put 
together within an amazingly short time in the midst of the immedi-
ate postwar confusion. In fact, it is reported that it took only nine days 
for the MacArthur staﬀ  to draft it.1
　The Constitution of 1947 was not the ﬁ rst constitution Japan had. In 
fact, Japan was the ﬁ rst country in Asia to have a written modern 
constitution. The ﬁ rst modern constitution was called the Constitution 
of the Empire of Japan, more commonly known as the Meiji Constitu-
tion, named after Emperor Meiji, the great grandfather of the present 
Emperor Akihito. It was promulgated in 1889 and went into eﬀ ect in 
1890. The Constitution of 1890 was patterned after the constitution of 
＊　This article is based on a text of the lecture given by the author at Baldwin-
Wallace College, Berea, Ohio, U.S.A., in their Constitution Day program.
１　For a detailed account of these nine days, see Suzuki, Nihonkoku Kempo wo Unda 
Misshitsu no Kokonokakan.
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imperial Germany, then called Prussia. The Meiji Constitution de-
clared that sovereignty resided in the divine emperor as the head of 
state and that the emperor gave the constitution as a gift to his sub-
jects. The Constitution’s recognition of imperial sovereignty gave it a 
ﬁ rm foundation in Japanese tradition. However, it was by no means a 
democratic constitution. One constitutional scholar characterizes it as 
“pseudo-constitutionalism.” 2
　When Japan was defeated in the Paciﬁ c War and accepted the Pots-
dam Declaration, Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu 
signed the Instrument of Surrender aboard the warship Missouri on 
September 2, 1945. As a result, the postwar occupation of Japan by 
the Allied Powers began. The allied occupation was led by General 
Douglas MacArthur who landed at Atsugi outside Tokyo on August 
30, 1945. 
   The major purposes of the Allied Occupation in Japan were three-
fold: （1） democratization, （2） de-militarization, and （3） de-centraliza-
tion of Japan. In order to carry out these objectives, the first task 
General MacArthur undertook was to rewrite the Meiji Constitution. 
The prewar constitution was not suitable to the new Japan for a num-
ber of reasons. The Meiji Constitution had the following characteris-
tics:
　1.   It embodied both centralized nationalism and constitutionalism.
　2.   Sovereignty and all the governing powers resided with the Em-
peror. （Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and 
governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.）
　3.   Subjects’ rights were protected within the provisions of law. 
　4.   The Imperial Diet consisted of a House of Peers and a House of 
２　Luney and Takahashi, eds., Japanese Constitutional Law, 30.
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Representatives. The House of Peers, composed of the Imperial 
Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those who had been nom-
inated thereto by the Emperor, was able to check the popularly 
elected House of Representatives. 
　5.   It gave the Emperor the powers to issue ordinances （Article 9） 
without the consent of the Diet and to issue an imperial ordi-
nance in case of emergency （Article 8）.
　6.   The Emperor had the prerogative of supreme command of the 
Army and Navy without consulting the Imperial Diet and the 
government. 
　On October 25, 1945, the Kijuro Shidehara Cabinet instituted the 
Committee to Investigate Constitutional Matters with Joji Matsumoto 
as the chairman of the committee, and it began considering constitu-
tional revision. The “Matsumoto Draft,” which was disclosed in Febru-
ary 1946, revealed that it did not really alter the basic principles of 
the Meiji Constitution giving the Emperor all the powers to govern. It 
also did not change the articles relating to the military and was weak 
on the protection of fundamental human rights. After seeing this 
Matsumoto Draft, SCAP realized that the Japanese government had 
no intention of, nor was it capable of, drafting a new constitution 
based on democracy and liberalism. 
   After rejecting the Matsumoto Draft, MacArthur ordered his staﬀ  
to draft an alternate revision. General MacArthur issued the so-called 
“MacArthur Notes,” indicating that three basic points were “musts” in 
constitutional revision: 
　I. The Emperor is at the head of state. 
His succession is dynastic. 
His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the 
Constitution and be responsible to the basic will of the people as 
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provided therein.3 
　II.  War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan re-
nounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and 
even for preserving its own security.
It relies upon the higher ideals that are now stirring the world 
for its defense and protection. 
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized, 
and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any 
Japanese force.4 
　III. The feudal system of Japan will cease. 
No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will ex-
tend beyond the lives of those now living. No patent of nobility 
will from this time forth embody within itself any national or 
civic power of government.
Pattern budget after British system.5
   Based on these three principles, SCAP and his staﬀ  completed their 
draft of the new constitution （“the MacArthur Draft”）. It took only 
nine days for the 25-member team to complete in secret a constitu-
tional revision draft. The Americans were swift because they wanted 
to have a complete draft before the Japanese government came up 
with any draft proposal and to avoid unnecessary political interven-
tions from other allied powers, especially the Soviet Union. The team 
included competent lawyers, journalist, political scientist, commis-
sioned oﬃ  cers, and some civilians. In the meantime, a number of other 
drafts were prepared by Japanese political parties as well as other or-
ganizations around the same time. It is thought that the staﬀ  of SCAP 
３　General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, History of 
the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945-1951, 39.
４　Ibid.
５　Op. cit., 39a.
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may have taken some of these drafts into consideration. SCAP also 
was to have looked at the United Nations Charter, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, U.S. the Constitution, the Weimar Republic 
Constitution, the Finnish Constitution, and the Soviet Unions Constitu-
tion. In any event, the government-sponsored Matsumoto Draft turned 
out to be by far the most conservative of all the drafts.
　As soon as the MacArthur Draft was completed, SCAP presented it 
to the Japanese government. The Japanese government was taken by 
surprise, never expeting to receive the MacArthur Draft of the new 
constitution. They were completely dismayed by language about the 
Emperor being  merely the symbol of the State and about popular 
sovereignty. However, as a defeated nation, they had no choice but to 
accept the MacArthur Draft. After reading it, the Japanese govern-
ment negotiated with SCAP on a number of issues. One important is-
sue was the unicameral Diet. The Americans wanted a one-House 
Diet. （The MacArthur Draft reads: The Diet shall consist of one 
House of elected representatives with a membership of not less than 
300 and not more than 500.） Another important issue was property 
right. Article 28 of the MacArthur Draft reads: The ultimate fee to 
the land and to all natural resources reposes in the State as the collec-
tive representative of the people. This article was modiﬁ ed later, and 
the right to private ownership of property was included in the consti-
tutional revision proposal. （The present constitution reads: The right 
to own or to hold property is inviolable.） Americans themselves modi-
ﬁ ed the earlier MacArthur Notes （this was believed to have been car-
ried out on the judgment of Colonel Cadis）; and Japan’s right of self-
defense （and the use of force for the purpose of self-defense）, negated 
by the MacArthur Notes, became acceptable to SCAP in the MacAr-
thur Draft. 
　After painstaking negotiations and modiﬁ cations on the MacArthur 
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Draft, the Japanese government issued guidelines which led to the ﬁ -
nal constitutional revision draft in April 1946. The constitutional revi-
sion proposal was presented to the 90th session of the Imperial Diet 
under the Meiji Constitution and deliberated for three months. After 
adding the “right to a certain （minimum） standard of living,” it was 
approved by 421 members with only 8 opposing votes in the House of 
Representatives.6 Subsequently, the House of Peers approved the 
amended draft constitution on October 6, 1946, by a standing vote of 
298 to 2.7 As we can see, the postwar constitution was enacted by the 
Imperial Diet in the form of an amendment to the Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan. The Constitution of Japan was promulgated on No-
vember 3, 1946, and went into eﬀ ect on May 3, 1947. 
　Although the 1947 Constitution was a revision of the 1890 Constitu-
tion, its provisions are strikingly antithetical. As noted, popular sover-
eignty replaced imperial sovereignty. The conditional rights of sub-
jects were superseded by the people’s “eternal and inviolate rights,” a 
second new principle. The third is paciﬁ sm, the renunciation of war in 
Article 9, which was intended as a sharp break with Japan’s modern 
history of war and expansion. In addition, the most contentious politi-
cal issue under the 1890 constitution―government responsible before 
Parliament―was resolved by an express provision for a British-style 
parliamentary government. An explicit provision for judicial review 
was also a new feature. The new constitution, therefore, is a constitu-
tion completely diﬀ erent from the Meiji Constitution. Japan again be-
came the ﬁ rst country in Asia to have a constitution of almost unre-
served democracy.8
６　General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, History of 
the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan 1945-1951, 54.
７　Op. cit., 56.
８　Luney and Takahashi, eds., Japanese Constitutional Law, 31.
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Political Inﬂ uences
　There are various inﬂ uences on the new postwar constitution. For 
analytical purposes, they can be divided into two kinds of inﬂ uences. 
One is a more deliberate political inﬂ uence, and the other is a more 
subtle, indirect inﬂ uence. The political inﬂ uences came directly from 
SCAP and his staﬀ . The legal inﬂ uences stemmed from the text and 
underlying philosophy of the American Constitution. 
　One of the political inﬂ uences is clearly manifested in the new sta-
tus of the Emperor. It was the policy of the U.S. government as well 
as of General MacArthur to preserve the Emperor as the head of 
state in order to carry out stable and eﬀ ective Occupation reforms so 
that Japan could become a democratic state. MacArthur had decided 
to exonerate Emperor Hirohito. As early as November 26, 1945, Mac-
Arthur was said to have confirmed that the Emperor’s abdication 
would not be necessary. He exonerated Hirohito and ignored the ad-
vice of many members of the Imperial Family and of Japanese intel-
lectuals who publicly asked for the abdication of the Emperor and the 
implementation of a regency. For example, Prince Mikasa （Takahito）, 
Hirohito’s youngest brother, even stood up in February 1946 and 
urged his brother to take responsibility for the defeat, and the well-
known poet Tatsuji Miyoshi wrote an essay in the magazine Shincho 
titled “The Emperor Should Abdicate Quickly.”9
   MacArthur’s decision to preserve the Emperor system was strongly 
reinforced after he met the Emperor for the ﬁ rst time on September 
27, 1945. He was deeply impressed by the Emperor’s sincere attitude. 
At that time the Emperor was at the top of the war criminals list pre-
pared by the Soviet Union and Britain. MacArthur feared that if the 
９　http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_MacArthur/
比較法文化　第17号（2009）58
TABLE 1　 Chronology of Events Leading to the Enactment of the 
Constitution of Japan
Date Event
August 14, 1945 Japan accepts the Potsdam Declaration.
October 11, 1945 General MacArthur issues the directive of ﬁ ve major reforms. 
January 1, 1946 Emperor Hirohito denies his divinity and declares his humanity. 
February 3, 1946 MacArthur orders the preparation of a draft of the new con-
stitution indicating three fundamental principles.
February 8, 1946 The Matsumoto Draft （Summary of the Constitutional 
Amendment） was submitted to GHQ.
February 10, 1946 The Political Bureau of the GHQ ﬁ nishes preparing a draft of 
the constitution.
February 13, 1946 The GHQ rejects the Matsumoto Draft and hands over the 
MacArthur Draft to the Japanese government.
February 22, 1946 The Japanese government decides to adopt the MacArthur 
Draft.
February 26, 1946 The ﬁ rst meeting of the Far Eastern Commission is held. 
March 6, 1946 After a series of negotiations with GHQ, the Japanese govern-
ment discloses a summary of the constitutional amendment. 
April 10, 1946 The ﬁ rst general election of the House of Representatives is 
held with universal male and female suﬀ rage after the new 
election law is enacted. 
April 17, 1946 The Japanese government discloses the draft of the constitu-
tional amendment. 
April 22, 1946 The Privy Council starts deliberating on the constitutional 
amendment. 
June 8, 1946 The Privy Council approves the amendment.
June 25, 1946 The House of Representatives starts deliberating on the con-
stitutional amendment.
August 24, 1946 The House of Representatives approves the amendment with 
modiﬁ cations. 
August 26, 1946 The House of Peers starts deliberating on the constitutional 
amendment.
October 6, 1946 The House of Peers approves the constitutional amendment.
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Emperor were executed, it might become necessary to have military 
rule with the possibility of insurgencies occurring in Japan. Therefore, 
he thought that the Emperor should be treated with care. He expect-
ed that the Emperor would entreat him not to be indicted as a war 
criminal, as many leaders of defeated nations would have done.  Mac-
Arthur wrote in his memoir, Reminiscences:
But my fears were groundless. What he said was this: “I come 
to you, General MacArthur, to oﬀ er myself to the judgment of 
the powers you represent―to bear sole responsibility for every 
political and military decision made and action taken by my 
people in the conduct of the war.” A tremendous impression 
swept me. This courageous assumption of a responsibility im-
plicit with death, a responsibility clearly belied by facts of 
which I was fully aware, moved me to the very marrow of my 
bones. He was an Emperor by inherent birth, but in that in-
stant I knew I faced the First Gentleman of Japan in his own 
right.10
　To make a long story short, the Emperor has become the symbol of 
the State and of the unity of the people in the new constitution. Popu-
lar sovereignty replaced the imperial sovereignty of the Meiji Consti-
tution, and the Emperor became a symbolic ﬁ gurehead, not able to act 
in state aﬀ airs without the advice and approval of the Cabinet. （Chap-
ter I）
　Another example of a strong political inﬂ uence that SCAP exerted 
was the pacifism and unarmed neutrality which was prescribed in 
Chapter 2 （Article 9） of the constitution. MacArthur wanted to make 
Japan an unarmed neutral, “the Switzerland of the Far East,” so that 
Japan would be completely demilitarized and weakened so as never to 
10　MacArthur, Reminiscences, 288.
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be able to rearm itself and resort to war in order to settle internation-
al disputes. 
　Chapter II and its single Article 9 （Renunciation of War） of the 
present constitution read: 
　 Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on jus-
tice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sov-
ereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means 
of settling international disputes. 2） In order to accomplish the aim 
of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as oth-
er war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognized.
　In the initial postwar period, the demilitarization of Japan was car-
ried out with great thoroughness. However, with the intensiﬁ cation of 
the Cold War in the late 1940’s, the idealistic policy of unarmed neu-
trality was reversed by the American government in order to make 
Japan an anti-communist fortress in the Far East vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union and China. The United States encouraged Japan to rearm itself, 
creating the National Police Reserve which was later developed into 
the Self-Defense Forces. 
Legal Inﬂ uence
　It is now apparent that there exists no American constitutional inﬂ u-
ence upon either Chapter 1 or Chapter 2 of the Constitution. But apart 
from these two chapters, the inﬂ uence of American constitutionalism 
is evident and decisive in the postwar constitution. Among many in-
ﬂ uences, it may be possible to point out three major aspects of signiﬁ -
cant American inﬂ uence on the 1947 Constitution: the idea of democ-
racy, individual rights, and judicial review.11
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（1） The Idea of Democracy
　First of all, the most important contribution of the United States 
Constitution to that of Japan was the concept of democracy. The dom-
inant characteristic of the Meiji Constitution was its so-called pseudo-
constitutionalism: the political system of prewar Japan can be regard-
ed as a modernized version of an absolute monarchy, and the concept 
of democracy was regarded as inadaptable to Japan. In sharp contrast, 
the postwar Constitution clearly declares that sovereignty resides in 
the people. Therefore, the idea of democracy can and should be ap-
plied and can penetrate without exception all the affairs of govern-
ment.12 
（2） Protection of Individual Rights
　The inﬂ uence of the United States Constitution has been most emi-
nent in the area of protecting individual rights. The postwar constitu-
tion has adopted various legal concepts based on the unique American 
concept of individualism, including the notions of freedom and equali-
ty, and it provides a detailed list of fundamental human rights. The 
very term “human rights” reminds us of the American idea of civil lib-
erties with a natural law ﬂ avor. The prewar constitution, on the other 
hand, was inﬂ uenced by the ideas of German legal positivism, deriving 
from the late nineteenth-century doctrine of state law. It gave no 
room to any concept deriving from the idea of natural law. Therefore, 
the respect for individual rights included in the postwar Constitution 
represents the most important diﬀ erence between postwar and pre-
war Japanese society.13 
（3） The Concept of Judicial Review
　Article 81 of the Constitution provides that “the Supreme Court is 
11　Luney and Takahashi, eds., Japanese Constitutional Law, 6.
12　Op. cit., 6-8.
13　Op. cit., 8-13-,
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the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality 
of any law, order, regulation or official act.” In view of the general 
background of American inﬂ uence in the drafting and subsequent de-
liberations attending the enactment of the Japanese Constitution, it is 
reasonable to assume that Article 81 was intended to introduce the 
American system of judicial review.14
　In view of the role that the Japanese Supreme Court has played in 
Japanese society, it does not seem to have the same prestige and im-
pact as the United States counterpart. The Court has never played 
the unique role in the country’s political and social life that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has played. The Court does not simply have enough 
authority or clout to hand down decisions which give hard blows to 
other branches of government. It looks like the Japanese judicial sys-
tem is so far content with the present situation.15
Constitutional Revisionism
　The 1947 Constitution has never been amended, not even once, de-
spite a continuous pro-revision sentiment that has occasionally sur-
faced in the Japanese political arena. Constitutional revisionism 
emerged cyclically in the postwar era, ﬁ rst time during the adminis-
tration of Ichiro Hatoyama （1954-56）. After a relatively long period of 
lull in the sixties and seventies, it re-emerged during the premiership 
of Yasuhiro Nakasone （1982-87）, a nationalist revisionist of long stand-
ing. It surfaced again in connection with the 50th anniversary of the 
Constitution in the 1990’s. For more than a half-century, the amend-
ment controversy has centered on Article 9, which renounces war 
and the maintenance of armed forces. The underlying issue, however, 
14　Op. cit., 16.
15　Op. cit., 20-25.
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has been attitudes toward modern constitutionalism itself.16
　The revisionists traditionally deny the legitimacy of the Constitu-
tion, insisting it had been “imposed” by the Allied Occupation, and 
called for the Emperor to be designated “sovereign,” as well as for 
changes in Article 9. Although they did not demand a return to impe-
rial sovereignty, by raising the emperor’s status from “symbol” to 
“sovereign,” they hoped to downgrade the signiﬁ cance of popular sov-
ereignty.17
TABLE 2　 A Comparison between the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan and the Constitution of Japan 
Constitution The Constitution of the Empire of Japan The Constitution of Japan
Promulgation 1898 1946
Enactment Enacted by the Emperor Enacted by the people
Sovereignty Imperial Sovereignty Popular Sovereignty
The Emperor Sacred and inviolable,
the head of the Empire, 
with the right of sover-
eignty
The symbol of the State 
and of national unity,  cab-
inet advice and approval 
required for all acts 
The military The prerogative of su-
preme command by the 
Emperor, conscription for 
male subjects
Paciﬁ sm, the renunciation 
of war, no armed forces 
maintained
Fundamental 
human rights
Subjects’ rights protected 
within the limits of the 
law
Fundamental human rights 
guaranteed
The separation 
of powers
No separation The establishment of the 
separation of powers
16　Higuchi, ed., Five Decades of Constitutionalism in Japanes Society, 351.
17　Ibid.
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　Reviewing constitutional revisionism in the postwar era, one may be 
able to point to three paradoxes. The ﬁ rst is the diﬀ erence between 
rhetoric and realism. The Liberal Democratic Party, formed in 1955, 
held power continuously until 1993. Throughout that 38-year span, the 
LDP called for an independent revision of the Constitution; neverthe-
less, it never initiated such procedures.18
　The second paradox lies in the nature of both the opponents and 
the supporters of the Constitution. The “independent revision” in LDP 
platforms implies that the Constitution was “imposed” by the Allied 
Occupation. The LDP has consistently challenged the legitimacy of 
the Constitution that symbolized Japan’s unreserved acceptance of 
freedom and democracy. On the other hand, the Japan Socialist Party 
was the self-proclaimed defender of the Constitution. The JSP, strong-
ly inﬂ uenced by Marxism, was the staunch supporter of what the Left 
termed a “bourgeois democratic Constitution.” The Japan Communist 
Party also insisted that it would prevent a “bad revision” （kaiaku） and 
frequently joined with the JSP to vehemently oppose the conserva-
tives’ attempts to amend the Constitution.19
　The third paradox is the frequently repeated justification for 
amendment that “Japan must become a normal nation （futsu no 
kuni）.” The revisionists attack Article 9 because the Japanese govern-
ment has been forced to interpret it as allowing only a “defensive ca-
pability （senshu boei）” and not “war potential （senryoku）,” thus de-
priving Japan of the military and diplomatic power of other “normal” 
nations. Yet the revisionists never took initiatives to normalize rela-
tions with Japan’s Asian neighbors, but in fact often blocked such ef-
forts.20
18　Op. cit., 352.
19　Op. cit., 353.
20　Ibid.
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New Moves toward the Constitution
　More than sixty years have passed since the Constitution of Japan 
went into eﬀ ect in May 1947. In spite of such a drastic change, the 
Japanese people have adapted very well to the new constitution. Lib-
eral democracy, though it is not perfect, functions quite well. Japanese 
people have enjoyed postwar prosperity and freedom. With new dem-
ocratic institutions, Japan was able to achieve a stable democracy and 
great power status in the international community. There have been 
a lot of debates and discussions as to what to do with the present con-
stitution. Although there is a plethora of opinions regarding the pres-
ent constitution, they can be roughly divided into three groups. 
　The ﬁ rst group consists of those who propose a complete overhaul 
or rewriting of the present constitution. The second group consists of 
those who propose some sort of partial revision to the constitution by 
modifying some of the articles and/or adding some new articles. The 
third group consists of those who want to preserve the present consti-
tution intact. 
1.  Complete revision or overhaul of the present constitution （kaikenron）
　These opinions come from nationalists who assert that the present 
constitution is a foreign-imposed constitution, and thus, it should be 
completely rewritten by the Japanese people. They say the present 
constitution is a mere translation of the MacArthur Draft and thus, it 
even sounds unnatural as a Japanese text. They also claim that it does 
not conform to the traditional cultural values of Japan. So, it needs to 
be rewritten from scratch. This group is sometimes called “reactionary 
revisionists （fukkoteki kaikenronja）.”
　Those who want to revise the constitution also say that Japan 
should become a “normal state” （futsu no kuni） by amending Article 9. 
They assert that Japan’s defense expenditure should be raised to 3 to 
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4 percent of GNP, the national average for NATO countries, which 
would enable Japan to be equipped with aircraft carriers and long-
range missiles. They also believe that Japan should make much great-
er international contributions by participating in the United Nations 
Forces or multi-lateral forces. 
2.  Partial Revision of the Constitution （kakenron, shukenron）
　The second group of people consists of those who favor partial revi-
sion of the present constitution. They believe that the present consti-
tution is basically good, but somewhat outdated sixty years after its 
promulgation. They believe that the new constitution should meet the 
needs of changing times. First, they believe that Article 9 should be 
modiﬁ ed so that the status and role of the Self-Defense Forces will be 
clearly deﬁ ned. In addition, they assert that some new articles should 
be added to meet the needs of contemporary society. This position is 
called “kakenron,” which means adding new articles to the present con-
stitution. For example, they believe that recently-developed concepts 
of human rights, e.g., the right to privacy, the right to a healthy envi-
ronment, the right to know and to access information, and also lower-
ing the legal age for adulthood from 20 to 18 should be added to the 
list of fundamental human rights. 
3.  Preservation of the Present Constitution （gokenron）
　The proponents of this position are the most conservative regarding 
the present constitution. Ironically, this position is often held by people 
on the left such as socialists and communists. They believe that the 
basic ideals and principles included in the present constitution are ex-
cellent, and therefore they should not be modiﬁ ed in a wrong direc-
tion. They are very cautious about those who propose to amend the 
constitution, especially regarding Article 9. They may not believe that 
the present constitution is untouchable （fuma no taiten）, but are ex-
tremely wary of the intentions and directions of constitutional revision 
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proposals.
　Those who oppose the amendment of Article 9 assert that Japan 
should make eﬀ orts to narrow the gap between ideals and reality, pos-
sibly bringing reality closer to the ideals. They insist that Japan could 
make adequate international contributions in the form of non-military, 
humanitarian aid such as assistance to refugees, economic aid, elimina-
tion of epidemics and poverty, and improvement in the areas of hu-
man rights and the environment. 
Revision Issues
　There have been lively debates on various issues concerning consti-
tutional revision. Among these issues, the first and most important 
has been focused on Article 9. Should Article 9 be amended at all? 
Some say that it should not be touched. Others say yes, but in what 
way and to what extent? Should the existing Self-Defense Forces 
（SDF） be turned into normal armed forces like those of other nations 
or should the existing SDF with limited roles be expressly written 
into the Constitution? Should the activities of the SDF be limited to 
strictly national defense （senshu boei）, or should they be allowed to 
exercise collective security defense if necessary, especially with the 
United States? Should the SDF extend their activities overseas and 
conduct military actions with UN sanction or even without it? Should 
SDF activities be limited to non-military, humanitarian activities or ex-
tended to military actions? What kind of international contributions 
should Japan make? Limited to humanitarian activities or full-ﬂ edged 
activities including military ones?21 
　The second most important issue may be the bicameral legislature. 
Japan has a bicameral Diet: the House of Representatives （lower 
21　Oishi and Ishikawa, eds., Kempo no Soten, 52-63.
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house） and the House of Councilors （upper house）. The argument 
here is: is it necessary to have a bicameral legislature? If so, what 
should be the appropriate power balance （relationship） between the 
two houses? This issue has been of particular interest recently be-
cause various stalemates were caused by the so-called “distorted Diet” 
（nejire kokkai） after the July 2007 House of Councilors election. At 
present, the House of Representatives is dominated by the two-third 
majority of the governing parties while the majority of the House of 
Councilors is controlled by the opposition parties. This of course has 
created various delays and stagnation in legislation, budget approval, 
and government actions.22 
　The third important issue may be the new rights and, possibly, du-
ties of Japanese nationals to be added to the present constitution. 
Most political parties and the general public agree that the present 
constitution is “outdated” and that some new rights should be added 
to the list of fundamental human rights in the Constitution. These in-
clude rights such as the right to a healthy environment （kankyoken）, 
the right to privacy （puraibashii-ken）, the right to know and free ac-
cess to information （shirukenri）, intellectual property rights （chiteki 
zaisanken）, etc. Recently, there is also a debate on the meaning of the 
right to a certain standard （minimum standard） of living （seizonken）, 
which already exists in the present constitution. This debate has been 
enhanced in the face of the diminishing middle class and the widening 
gap between the rich and the poor （kakusa shakai） in the globalized 
economy.23
　The fourth important issue may be decentralization （chiho bunken）. 
Today Japan is still a very centralized state. There is, however, an in-
22　Op. cit., 190-191.
23　Op. cit., 64-189.
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creasing demand for more decentralization to create more efficient 
and vibrant local government. This of course means giving more au-
thority to local governments from the central government over areas 
such as taxation and budget. The existing system of local govern-
ments itself is an issue also.  Some argue that the present 47 prefec-
ture system （todofuken） should be changed and integrated into a 
broader state and county （doshu） system so that local governments 
can operate more eﬃ  ciently within larger boundaries.24 
　There are other issues: public welfare and public order, popular 
election of the Prime Minister （shusho kosensei）, establishment of a 
military tribunal and a constitutional court, and subsidies to private 
schools by public ﬁ nance.25 
Public Opinion
　Major Japanese newspapers and public opinion poll organizations 
periodically conduct public opinion surveys on various aspects of the 
Constitution. Over the years, they do demonstrate some changes in 
Japanese people’s attitudes toward the Constitution. Looking at the 
various public opinion surveys, I may be able to draw some tentative 
conclusions on Japanese people’s attitudes toward the present consti-
tution. 
　1.  A majority of people now seem to favor some form of constitu-
tional revision, and fewer people seem to be opposed to consti-
tutional revision now than before. 
　2.  Those who want to rewrite the constitution completely seem to 
be a small minority. 
　3.  Those who favor partial revision of the Constitution want to 
24　Op. cit., 324.
25　For another comprehensive review of revision issues, see Watanabe ed., Kempo 
Kaisei no Soten.
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make the status and role of the Self-Defense Forces clearly de-
ﬁ ned in Article 9. However, there is also a strong resistance to 
changing Article 9 in any direction. According to the recent 
Asahi Shimbun opinion survey, 66% of people feel that it should 
not be changed at all, about three times as much as those who 
want it changed. Even among those who want to change it, only 
38% feel that the Self-Defense Forces should be elevated to nor-
mal military forces, and 56% feel that the present status of the 
Self-Defense Forces should be written into the Constitution. 
　4.  Some feel that the new concepts of human rights such as the 
right to privacy, the right to a healthy environment, the right to 
know and to access information should be added to the Consti-
tution. 
TABLE 3　Major Issues for Constitutional Revision
The status of the Emperor
Article 9 and the Self-Defense Forces
Collective security
Public interest and public order
Fundamental human rights̶inclusion of new rights 
Limitation of human rights and listing of obligations
Lowering the legal age for adulthood from 20 to 18
Popular election of Prime Minister （shusho kosensei）
Bicameral legislature―the relationship between the two Houses
Creation of a military tribunal and/or a constitutional court
Public subsidies to private schools  
Local government
Right to a certain standard of living （seizonken）
Constitutional amendment 
Source:  Oishi, Makoto and Kenji Ishikawa, eds. Kempo no Soten. Watanabe, Osamu, ed. 
Kempo Kaisei no Soten.
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TABLE 4　Public Opinion Survey by the Asahi Shimbun
Looking at the Constitution as a whole, do you think that the pres-
ent constitution needs to be revised or does not need to be revised?  
　Needs to be revised 55%
　Does not need to be revised 32%
　Others/no answers 13%
To those who answered “needs to be revised,” what is your reason?
　（One answer）
　Because new rights and institutions should be included 38%
　Because it is better to include more citizens’ duties. 17%
　Because there is a problem with Article 9. 9%
　Because there has been no amendment since the enactment. 13%
　Because we want to create a constitution of our own, not one 
　　imposed by the U.S.A. 21%
　Others/no answers 2%
Source: The Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2005
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TABLE 5　Public Opinion Survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun
Do you think that it is better to revise the present Constitution or 
better not to revise it?
　Better to revise it 55.5%
　Better not to revise it 32.3%
　No answer 12.3%
To those who answered “Better to revise it,” what is the reason you 
think it is better to revise it? Enumerate as many answers you like:
　It was a constitution imposed by the U.S.A. 33.6%
　It should clearly state the national right of self-defense and 
　　clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Forces. 32.5%
　Too many rights are asserted, and duties are neglected. 25.3%
　There will be confusion if we act on the basis of interpretations 
　　and applications. 32.9%
　There are new issues regarding international contributions 
　　which cannot be handled eﬀ ectively under the present 
　　constitution. 47.7%
　Others 1.5%
　No answer 1.9%
To those who answered “Better not to revise it,” what are the rea-
sons why you think it is better not to revise it?  （Multiple answers）
　It is already well established among the citizens. 36.3%
　It is a paciﬁ st constitution that we can be proud
　　of internationally. 51.5%
　Fundamental human rights and democracy are guaranteed. 26.7%
　We will be able to make a range of adjustments
　　to changing times through interpretation and application. 20.5%
　If it is amended, it may open the road to Japan’s acquiring
　　great military power. 34.2%
　Others 1.0%
　No answer 0.7%
Source:  The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 4, 2006
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TABLE 6　Public Opinion Survey by the Mainichi Shimbun
Do you favor revising the present constitution or do you not favor 
it?
　Favor 65%
　Do not favor 27%
To those who favored, what is the reason you favor revision?
　Because the present constitution does not suit the times. 53%
　Because the present constitution was imposed by the U.S.A. 10%
　Because the present constitution has never been amended
　　since it was enacted. 18% 
　Because there is a gap between the activities of
　　the Self-Defense Forces and Article 9. 13%
　Because the present constitution overvalues individual rights. 3%
To those who did not favor revision, what is the reason you oppose it?
　Because the present constitution suits the times. 4%
　Because there is no positive reason for revision. 11%
　Because it may lead to the amendment of Article 9. 54%
　Because it may limit individual rights and prescribe
　　excessive duties. 3%
　Because there have not been adequate discussions on the issue 
　　among citizens and political parties. 26%
Source: The Mainichi Shimbun, March 5, 2006
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TABLE 7　 Public Opinion Survey on the Constitution Conducted by 
the Asahi Shimbun, April 19-20, 2008
• Do you think constitutional amendment has become a realistic 
matter or is it still premature?
　Realistic matter 52%
　Premature matter 35%
To those who said “realistic,” what is your reason?
　（One answer）
　 Because there is now institutional preparedness such as
　　the National Referendum Law. 20%
　Because there are concrete proposals like the LDP draft of a 
　new constitution. 15%
　Because there is more understanding among citizens. 57%
To those who said “premature,” what is your reason?
　 Because there is a deep cleavage between governing parties 
　and opposition parties. 19%
　 Because Prime Minister Abe, who was keen on constitution 
　revision, has stepped down. 5%
　Because the time is not ripe for it among the people. 71%
• Looking at the constitution as a whole, is it necessary to revise the 
present constitution or not necessary to revise it?
　It is necessary to revise it. 58%
　It is not necessary to revise it. 31%
To those who said that it is necessary to revise it, what is the rea-
son?
　（One answer）
　Because we want to write a new constitution on our own. 9%
　Because there are problems concerning Article 9. 13%
　Because new rights and institutions should be included. 74%
 To those who said that it is not necessary to revise the constitution, 
what is the reason?
　（One answer）
　Because it is well established among citizens, and there is 
　　no urgent need for revision. 29%
　Because Article 9 may be amended. 51%
　Because it is useful for guaranteeing freedom and rights. 17%
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• The Constitution prescribes in Article 9 that the Japanese people 
forever renounce war and that military forces will not be main-
tained. Do you think it is better to change Article 9 or better not 
to change it?  
　Better to change it 23%
　Better not to change it 66%
 To those who answered “better to change it,” how should Article 9 
be changed?
　Just by writing in the Self-Defense Forces as they now exist. 56%
　By preseribing the Self-Defense Forces as military forces like 
those of other countries. 38%
• Now, we would like to ask you about the overseas activities of the 
Self-Defense Forces. Which of the following statements comes clos-
est to your opinion?
　（One answer）
　No overseas activities are acceptable. 15%
　 Overseas activities are acceptable as long as they do not use 
　　military force. 64%
　If necessary, the use of military force is acceptable. 17%
• In the present Diet, the governing parties have a majority in the 
House of Representatives whereas the opposition parties have a 
majority in the House of Councilors. While bills and personnel are 
not easily approved, the views of opposition parties are better re-
ﬂ ected. Do you think the present state of the National Diet is de-
sirable?
　Desirable 26%
　Not desirable 58%
• Under the present constitution, the House of Representatives has 
a certain amount of precedence in decisions regarding the budget 
and bills. Some people say that the Constitution should be amend-
ed so that the powers of the House of Representatives will be fur-
ther strengthened. Do you agree with this opinion or disagree?
　Agree 23%
　Disagree 58%
Source: The Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2008.
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Conclusions
　The Constitution of Japan is now more than sixty years old. It has 
never been amended, not even once. The American Constitution is 
more than two hundred years, and has been amended twenty-seven 
times. Evaluations and opinions of the Japanese Constitution at the 
age of sixty-one are extremely varied. Some people would say that it 
has become merely a nominal document. Some deplore its erosion 
while others say that the Constitution is out of touch with reality and 
should be amended. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the 
Japanese Constitution is unimportant because by doing so one may be 
misinterpreting postwar history. It is true that the Constitution has 
withstood harsh criticism at home and abroad for more than sixty 
years to become a cornerstone of constitutionalism in Japanese soci-
ety. Without constitutionalism, Japan could not have achieved the de-
mocracy that Japanese people enjoy so much today. In many coun-
tries ruling elites try to justify authoritarianism in the name of 
economic development. Japan’s experience suggests that the rule of 
law speciﬁ ed in the Constitution is vital to both democracy and eco-
nomic development.26
　It is also important to point out that Japan has presented itself as a 
synthesis of local tradition and imported legal concepts. As the experi-
ence of many non-Western countries shows, to implant Western-style 
of constitutionalism in a society and adjust it to traditional identities is 
indeed difficult. Japan’s trial-and-error approach in the postwar era 
should be a valuable example for peoples facing similar challenges.27
　Lastly, I believe that the future of the Japanese constitution de-
26　Higuchi, ed. Five Decades of Constitutionalism in Japanese Society, 3.
27　Chantebout, Droit constitutionnel et science politique, 372-374.
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pends on what kind of state Japanese people really want for future 
generations: a normal state （futsu no kokka） or a paciﬁ st state （heiwa 
shugi kokka） or something else? Even if we want to remain a paciﬁ st 
nation, do we want to retreat to self-centered, isolationist paciﬁ sm （ik-
koku heiwashugi） or do we want to promote paciﬁ sm more actively 
among peoples in the world? These are some of the serious questions 
that Japanese people must answer before they can undertake to re-
vise or perhaps rewrite the present constitution.
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